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Government's expenditure is constrained to
equal the sum oftaxes plus the sales ofdebt
to the public (including banks) plus the
creation ofmonetary base by the Federal
Reserve. Since deficits are the excess of
government expenditure over taxes, the
budget constraint may also be expressed as:
deficits must equal the sales ofdebt to the
publicplus the creation ofmonetary base by
the Federal Reserve.
Ricardian equivalence
The current policy debate centers on
whetherornotdifferent compositions of
government finance result in crowdingout.
In particular, does issuing more debt and
lowering taxes raise real interest rates and
crowd outprivate investment? Ricardo gave
an early analysis ofthe problem in his
Principles ofPolitical Economy and
Taxation (1821).
He argued that iftaxpayers fu lIy understood
that government borrowing only postpones
the payment o!.taxes, itwouId not matter at
all howdeficitswerefinanced. Ifthe govern-
ment chose to finance agiven expenditure
through taxes, each taxpayer could borrow
enough topayhis taxes (i.e., sell abond) and
then would immediately have to pay only
the interest and some portion ofthe princi-
pal on the loan. Ifthe government financed
Reserve System, which although formally
independentofthe executivebranch, can be
treated for ourpurposes as part ofthe gov-
ernment. When the Federal Reserve buys
Treasurydebt, itpays with an increase in the
monetary base which will be held either as
reserves ofdepository financial institutions
or as currency in the hands ofthe public.
This transaction is sometimes called "mone-
tizing the debt," and it leaves the public
holding more non-interest bearing govern-
ment liabilities in the form of money and
fewer interest-bearing liabilities in the form
ofTreasury securities.
Government's budget constraint
All federal expenditures must be paid for,
but there is a choice of sources for the
needed funds. The Treasury can raise taxes,
or itcan go into debt. Its debt may either be
held by the public at large or by the Federal
Everybody's jumping to the conclusion that
Icrowding out] is going to happen in 30
days ...it's notgoing to happen in three
months. (Secretary ofthe Treasury, Donald
T. Regan, quoted in the Washington Post,
August 23, 1983.)
With the prospect of large federal govern-
mentdeficits duringthis year and perhaps
for several years to come, the question as to
whattheireffects will be is in the forefrontof
discussionsofeconomicpolicy. Reasonable
people evidently differon the answer.
Unfortunately, it is not always clear from
theirpronouncementswhatthe basisoftheir
judgments is. Close examination shows that
what may lie atthe heartoftheir differences
are some fundamental conceptual issues in
economic theory-in particular, whether
taxation and government borrowing are
economically equivalent forms ofgovern-
ment finance, and whether it makes adiffer-
ence ifgovernment debt takes the form of
interest-bearing bonds or non-interest-bear-
ing currency and bank reserves. This Letter
builds on adiscussion by the nineteenth
century English classical economist David
Ricardo to help clarify these issues.
Classical Reflections On The Deficit
The primary long-term effect ofdeficits is to
reduce the rate ofcapital formation. Gov-
ernment borrowing crowds alit private
borrowingandcauses a lowerrate ofinvest-
ment. The lower rate ofcapital formation
hurts productivity, decreases growth, limits
the rise in real incomes and weakens our
international competitiveness. (Martin
Feldstein, Chairman ofthe President's
Council of Economic Advisers in the Wall
Streetjournal,)uly 15, 1983.)
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the same deficit by selling its own bonds to
the public, the taxpayers would be taxed to
pay the interest and the currently maturing
principal on the governmentbonds. In either
case, the taxpayer might pay the taxes with-
out borrowingthe money, but ifhe treated
the amount paid as a loan to himself, he
would find that the portion ofhis income
available for consumption would be no less
than ifhehad actually borrowedthe money.
Ricardo argued, in effect, that the composi-
tion ofgovernment finance for the same
level ofexpenditure made no difference
since taxpayers can make exactly compen-
sating adjustments in theirown portfolios.
Ricardo's argumentfor the equivalence of
debtand taxation rests on at least two im-
plicit assumptions. The first is that taxpayers
are economically similar. Ifthis assumption
were relaxed, then taxpayers' after-tax in-
comes would be affected by the method of
government finance. Suppose, for example,
thatsome peopleare seen by lenders to be a
greater risk than others and are, therefore,
charged a higher rate ofinterest. Lowering
taxes and issuing an equal amountofdebt
means that high-risk borrowers have more
cash in hand and pay itbackthrough taxes at
a lowerrate than they would pay ifthey had
borrowed it privately. Debtfinance would
thus affect their incomes. In the same way,
ifthe people who buy most of the bonds
differed from those who pay most ofthe
taxes, substituting debt for taxes would
affect incomes. The second assumption is
that taxes are notdistorting, that they do not
alter the optimal allocation of resources. If
this assumption were relaxed, for example,
iftaxes were levied only on consumption
(e.g., sales taxl, then loweringtaxes and rais-
ing debtwould favor consumption at the
expense ofinvestment.
Ricardo recognized thathis argumentfor the
equivalence ofdebtfinance and taxation
was a theoretical one thatdepended cru-
cially on accurate anticipations offuture
taxes. He believed that, in practice, there
would be "debt-illusion" in the sense that
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taxpayers would save enough to pay only
the taxesthat cover the interest on the debt
and forget about the need to repay the prin-
cipal in the future. Debt finance would then
appearto be more stimulative than tax
finance when the economy is operating at
less than full employment.
IfRicardo's theoretical argument held in
practice, different splits between taxes and
debt finance would notaffect spendable
incomes. Private saving would always
adjust to the amount needed to service the
debt, and interest rates would notbe
affected. On the other hand, ifRicardo's
practical judgment were correct, taxpayers
would feel richer when governmentexpen-
diture is financed by debt rather than by
taxes. They would wantto spend more, but
sincethey would notactually be richer, they
could only spend more by saving less. To
induce them to save enough to cover the
debt, the interest rate on government bonds
would have to rise. Higher interest rates
would then discourage private investment.
Thus, when there is debt illusion, the more
the method ofgovernment finance opts for
debtovertaxes, the lowerwould be the level
of fJrivate investment and the higher the
level ofprivate consumption.
The burdenofdebt
Despite showing that debt and taxes could
beequivalent, Ricardobelieved that govem-
mentshould favor taxes overdebt even if
there were nodebt-illusion. His reason was
thatpresenttaxes are immediateand hard to
escape, butalarge debtimplyinghigh future
taxes would encourage emigration to avoid
paying future taxes. Ricardo's argument can
be reformulated to show that the present
generation can escape taxes by incurring
debtthat must be paid by generations that
live long after the present one is dead and
gone. It is said that "thepast is another
country." The present generation, in effect,
would emigrate to the past by shifting the
burden ofdebt onto its descendants. That
burden can be measured by the degree to
which the capital stock is smaller becauseprevious generations invested less as a re-
sponse to higher interest rates caused by the
choice ofdebt financing.
This theoretical analysis raises two ques-
tions: First, can the burden ofdebt actually
be shifted onto future generations? That is,
aretaxes and debtfinanceequivalentacross
generations? Second, is it desirable to shift
the burden ofdebt? The answer to the
second question depends on one's values,
butits importancedepends on the answer to
the first question.
Ricardo believed that the burden ofgovern-
ment debtcan be shifted to othergenera-
tions. His implicitassumption is that the
debtmusteventually be paid offby the tax-
payers, butthat itcan be postponed by issu-
ingmore debt. If this were done continu-
ously, no future generation would be taxed
to payoffthe debt. And each generation
wouId believe falsely that it was richer, and
interest rates would remain high to ensure
that savings were sufficient to buy newly
issued debt.
Critics ofthis idea argue that there is some
debtsize, orsomeratioofthe debtto nation-
al income, beyond which no one would
want to buy governmentbonds, that is, at
which the government has limited "collat-
eraL" Atthatpoint, the debtmusteventually
be paid off. How much collateral the gov-
ernment is supposed to have is notclear.
Nevertheless, the critics believe that atthe
pointatwhich thegovernmentcould notsell
any more debt, itwould have to cover its
deficitsbycreatingmonetary base. And they
believe that this monetary expansion could
cause inflation.
Can this implicitdistinction between the
economic effects ofan increase ofthe
interest-bearingdebtand ofthe monetary
base be sustained? One could argue, in
theory, thatan expansion ofthedebtat arate
much faster than the rate ofgrowth ofna-
tional income would require ever-rising
interest rates. And since moneyyields azero
3
orfixed rate ofreturn, these high rates would
induce people to hold more government
bonds and less money. Such asituation is
equivalenttoarise in thevelocityofcircula-
tion ofmoney, which would support a
higher rate ofinflation.
In practice, we are notfacing such a hyper-
expansion ofgovernmentdebt. Instead, we
are facing a large increase in the ratio of
interest-bearing government debtto non-
interest-bearing monetary base. In the
long-run, since both are nominal liabilities
of the government, it may make little differ-
ence which is used to finance the deficit. In
the short-run, however, the government can
sell more debtto the private sector only by
offering a higher rate ofreturn to increase its
attractiveness. That this rise in interest rates
will crowd-out private investment is the




Compared with the recent past, current
monetary and fiscal policy in the United
States places relatively more weighton
deficit finance than ori taxation, with the
deficit being financed more by governrnent
debt than by money creation. Whateffects
this policy stance should be expected to
have on the economy in the long-run
depends on howone decides the main
issues discussed in this Letter. In other
words, which Ricardo does one believe?
The "practical" Ricardo expects present
policy to crowd out investment, but the
"theoretical" Ricardo expects few ill effects
to resu It from the large governmentdeficits
currently facing the U.S.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in Iilillions)











loans(gross, adjusted) and investments* 161,743 - 304 - 1,304 - 0.8
loans(gross, adjusted) - total# 141,658 - 294 - 951 - 0.7
Commercial and industrial 43,058 - 208 - 2,675 - 5.8
Real estate 57,113 48 - 509 - 0.9
Loans to individuals 24,724 153 1,206 5.1
Securities loans 2,662 272 23 0.9
U.s. Treasury securities* 7,417 6 837 12.7
Othersecurities* 12,667 - 16 - 1,191 - 8.6
Demand deposits - total# 39,693 - 582 1,208 3.1
Demand deposits - adjusted 28,669 7 1,915 7.2
Savings deposits - totalt 65,527 45 34,632 112.1
Time deposits - total# 67,111 - 125 - 33,922 - 33.6
Individuals, part. & corp. 61,481 - 4 - 29,474 - 32.4
(Large negotiable CD's) 17,344 - 21 - 20,679 - 54.4
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+l/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings
















* Excludes tradingaccount securities.
# Includes items not shown separately.
t Includes Money Market Deposit Accounts, Super-NOW accounts, and NOW accounts.
Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor(Gregory Tong) or to the author ....Free copiesof
this and other Federal Reserve publications can be obtained by calling or writing the Public Informa~
tion Section, Federal Reservt;! Bank ofSanFrancisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120. Phone (415)
974-2246.